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CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGMENT 
Gene R. Nichol* 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. By Philip Bobbitt. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Basil Blackwell, Inc. 1991. Pp. 228. Cloth, $47.95; paper, 
$16.95. 
Once upon a time, there was a liberal activist U.S. Supreme Court. 
An ex-California Governor, a populist southern Senator, an NAACP 
litigator, a New Jersey Supreme Court Justice, a law professor, and 
some others initiated a legal revolution in America. They enforced the 
Bill of Rights against the states, dismantled legally imposed segrega-
tion, interpreted laws to provide protection for the poor, nixed orches-
trated public school prayer, made the Fourth Amendment meaningful, 
discovered a right to "privacy," made Miranda a household word, and 
held that the guarantees of freedom of speech and the press actually 
limit the authority of government. 
Many found the vision of law and legal institutions that the War-
ren Court announced both consistent and inspiring. Idealistic young 
lawyers entered the profession as a way of fostering human dignity 
and equality. Litigators searched for "impact" cases, and law profes-
sors cheered the Court in its crusade. It seemed possible to change the 
world without going to the trouble of getting elected to office. It was, 
in short, heady stuff. 
But, as is usually the case, not everyone saw the Warren Court the 
same way. At first, southern racists and states' rights advocates as-
sailed the Court's work, but this only enhanced the apparent justice of 
the Court's efforts. Eventually, however, large numbers of Americans 
and their leaders began to see the Supreme Court's record as one of 
usurpation. This, after all, is a democracy. If unelected judges dictate 
unalterable national social policies, we have ceased to govern our-
selves; even "progressive" political rules should be subjected to the 
rigors of the electoral process. So presidents promised to change the 
direction of the judiciary - they appointed jurists who would apply 
the law, not make it up, and who would "strictly construe" the consti-
tutional charter. 1 This political move, to be sure, was not an immedi-
ate success. Not only did the first set of new justices fail to launch an 
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1973, Oklahoma State; J.D. 
1976, University of Texas. - Ed. 
1. President Nixon eventually may have found reason to soften his views on strict construc-
tion. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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effective counterrevolution,2 but they declared women legally equal 
and rather violently discarded the country's abortion laws. Neverthe-
less, a course was set, and after ten tries or so, conservative presidents 
have achieved some measure of success. 
While this political-legal battle raged, an academic cottage indus-
try was born, or perhaps reborn. Constitutional theorists appeared 
and chose sides. Most of them sought, quite overtly, to salvage and 
justify what they considered the heroic legacy of the Warren and early 
Burger Courts. To explain that Brown 3 and Roe 4 were correctly de-
cided, and thatLochner 5 was not, became vital. That task alone was a 
full time job; but it was, no doubt, a job worth doing. For if theories 
could be woven with sufficient persuasiveness and sufficient power, the 
judicial world would listen. A majestic view of constitutionalism 
could thus be secured. 
Of course, only part of the academic community joined in this en-
terprise. Others honed critical skills by attacking the activist legacy. 
Not only, in their view, was the Court's work illegitimate, but the 
academy's defense of it was even more elitist and flawed. Discretion in 
the hands of a social-engineering judiciary clearly amounted to an as-
sumed authority to legislate. These critics, therefore, called for signifi-
cant restraints on judicial power. When another former California 
Governor received the appointment power, he seemed just the fellow 
to put such restraints in place. In some important ways, he did so. 
What both of these academic camps had in common was a belief 
that legal scholars were significant constitutional actors. Like editorial 
writers for major newspapers, their essays and critiques would temper 
the movement of government. Like minor oracles, they could speak 
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Not mere speculative theorists, 
these players' efforts would bring forth the desired fruit or the sought-
after social policy. 
Gradually, though, things began to change. For liberal theorists, 
the federal judiciary became a foreign domain. Republican presidents 
knew what they were doing; the new jurists had different inclinations 
than Earl Warren and William Brennan. At least by the mid-1980s, 
liberal activists could no longer realistically believe that the judiciary 
would be sympathetic to their suggestions. In a fundamental sense, 
the conservative academic critics were no better off. Their strongest 
successes had come in debunking the work of the Court and its de-
fenders. Although the political winds now blew in their direction, 
they had a difficult time taking "yes" for an answer. If the liberal 
2. See VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 
(1983). 
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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theorists seemed suddenly anachronistic, the conservative critics had 
lost their principal targets and the opportunity to display their talent 
for hurling grenades. They suddenly lacked direction. 
In recent years, to oversimplify grossly, constitutional scholars 
have tended to react to their lost judicial audience in one of two ways. 
First, and always an alternative in academia, many have simply kept 
doing the same thing. 6 Somewhat more sophisticated and less doctri-
nal, frequently more "textured," and often reflecting the learning of 
other disciplines, these experts have continued to produce advocacy 
scholarship and simply ignored the fact that no one who counted was 
actually listening. 7 They are, as my colleague Pierre Schlag puts it, 
"normative" with "nowhere to go."8 
Presumably more sophisticated commentators turned inward, 
crafting works designed primarily to be read by" other academics. This 
brand of constitutional theory, or perhaps "metatheory,"9 concerned 
itself little with the application of legal principles and reflected a cer-
tain detachment from law and its institutions.10 Metatheorists deem-
phasized the work of judges and were decidedly less inclined to 
attempt to supply "correct" interpretations of the Constitution. They 
wasted no more time constructing doctrinal arguments that could con-
6. Pierre Schlag argues that "[b]y and large, [liberal scholars] are still writing articles for the 
Warren Court (or wishing they could)." Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 
U. PA. L. REV. 801, 907 (1991). 
7. I am obviously reluctant to list any citations as examples of scholarship of this genre. 
Many of these people are my friends. A couple of recent examples, though, are Akhil R. Amar, 
The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REv. 124 
(1992), and Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relation-
ship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161 (1988). It seems safer 
to list some of my own work. See GeneR. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 315 (1984); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. 
L. REV. 1117 (1989); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Left, the Right, and Certainty in Constitutional 
Law, 33 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1181 (1992) [hereinafter Nichol, Constitutional Law]. But then, 
I've been a dean for a long time. 
8. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990). See generally 
Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Conference on Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory and the Practice 
of Judging, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 291 (1992) (symposium explaining the relationship between 
constitutional scholarship and the practice of judging). 
9. Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or, Why, And to Whom, 
Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389 (1992). 
10. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); MARK v. TUSHNET, RED, 
WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); J.M. Balkin, 
What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966 (1992); Martha Minow, Iden-
tities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (1991); Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi'~· The 
Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990); 
Schlag, supra note 6; Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional 
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990); see also Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanis-
tic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 
DUKE L.J. 191, 271 (1991) ("The true realm and metier of legal scholarship, like that of all 
scholarship, is the world of ideas. It bears approximately the same relationship to adjudication 
that poetry bears to nursery rhymes."). Compare these sentiments with those expressed in Harry 
T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
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ceivably appeal to members of the judicial elite. Their work, to gener-
alize, looked more and more like that of the humanities and less and 
less like that of the legal profession. "[C]onstitutional law as practiced 
in the legal academy ... cast itself adrift, whether out of desperation, 
disgust, or despair, and engaged itself in spinning gossamer webs of 
republicanism, deconstruction, dialogism, feminism, or what have 
you."11 
* * * 
I have little doubt that the portrait of modem constitutional schol-
arship described above contains a significant dose of truth. The al-
tered audience for constitutional theory, the expanded boundaries of 
the scholarship itself, the increased intellectualization of the legal 
academy, the estrangement of the professoriate from the legal profes-
sion and its institutions, and the political chasm that has developed 
between academics and the bench have led to an identity crisis for 
American constitutional scholars. That crisis has made the work of 
Philip Bobbitt12 - his struggles and false starts, his clear successes 
and scholarly aspirations - particularly interesting. Bobbitt's efforts 
may perhaps provide useful lessons about the future of constitutional 
scholarship. 
Bobbitt's first major effort, Constitutional Fate, published in 1982, 
presented a morphology of constitutional arguments. Emphasizing 
the patterns of legal discourse or the "modalities" of justificatory argu-
ment, Bobbitt embraced an ennobling vision of judicial review. Devot-
ing separate chapters to historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, 
structural, and ethical argument, he turned away from traditional ef-
forts to legitimize constitutional review in favor of a description of 
accepted conventions in a continuing dialogue about the appropriate 
scope of judicial authority. In some ways, then, Bobbitt presaged the 
metatheorists - offering a theory about interpretive theories - and 
he did it with a depth and an elegance too seldom revealed in legal 
scholarship. But like a good Warren Court apologist, his modalities 
tended, in virtually every instance, to sustain the work of the father -
he lionized Griswold, 13 Roe, 14 Sullivan, 15 Schempp, 16 Reynolds, 11 and, 
of course, Brown. 18 Furthermore, Bobbitt noted that the role of the 
11. Balkin, supra note 10, at 1967. 
12. Baker and Botts Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin and Fellow of Nuffield 
College, Oxford University. 
13. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe, of course, is actually a Burger Court decision. 
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
16. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting orchestrated public 
school prayer). 
17. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (reapportionment). 
18. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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U.S. Supreme Court included the authority "to give concrete expres-
sion to the unarticulated values of a diverse nation."19 Again, heady 
stuff. No wonder I liked it.20 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION - LEGITIMACY AND 
CONSTRAINT 
Despite the clear power of Constitutional Fate, critics identified 
two substantial shortcomings. First, Bobbitt did not offer convincing 
arguments, apart from the traditions of discourse, for the legitimacy of 
judicial review itself. Second, and perhaps more troubling, Constitu-
tional Fate presented no methodology for decisionmaking when con-
flicts between the various modes of argument arise. It was, therefore, 
massively indeterminate. Textualism, historicism, prudentialism, and 
doctrinalism, for example, all might well be accepted patterns of con-
stitutional inquiry, but in actual disputes they frequently lead in op-
posing directions.21 Bobbitt offered no hierarchy of modalities or 
other method for determining if one pattern could trump another. 
In Constitutional Interpretation, Bobbitt returns to these difficulties 
and to constitutional analysis more generally. Like his earlier work, 
Constitutional Interpretation makes probing and forceful reading. In 
some measure, Bobbitt also appears as a 1990s academic; he explores 
the theories not just of Dworkin, Fish, Unger, and Rawls, but Rorty, 
Dummett, and Wittgenstein as well. Nevertheless, when Bobbitt ap-
pears as philosopher or hermeneuticist, he remains, to our good for-
tune, a lawyer. It is an interesting and promising turn. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Bobbitt clings to his earlier deemphasis 
of legitimacy questions: "We must put aside our fascination with the 
mirage of the Countermajoritarian Objection" (p. 9). None of the 
traditional approaches to the legitimacy of judicial review succeeds, he 
claims, because each depends on assumptions about the appropriate 
form of argument that can only be validated as a consequence of judi-
cial review itself (p. 8). Judicial review is, instead, "a practice by 
which constitutional legitimacy is assured, not endowed" (p. 9). Law, 
then, "is something we do, not something we have as a consequence of 
something we do" (p. 24). The modalities Bobbitt again identifies -
historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical - are 
the ways law statements in constitutional matters are assessed. No 
appropriate constitutional argument exists outside these spheres. 
Constitutional decisionmaking, therefore, is a practice, like "do-
ing" economics or "doing" mathematics. No external referent is nec-
essary to legitimize it - whether Dworkin's moral and political 
19. PHILIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 211 (1982). 
20. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Giving Substance Its Due, 93 YALE L.J. 171 (1983). 
21. Consider, for example, the question whether overt discrimination against homosexuals is 
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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philosophy,22 Fish's interpretive community,23 or "whathaveyou."24 
Nor is one desirable. Constitutional determinations are not true or 
false statements about the world. They are, rather, "moves within a 
serious game . . . as practised as any classical ballet and . . . no less 
contingent" (p. 34). This "solution," Bobbitt concedes, will fail to sat-
isfy many because it separates legitimation from justification and, in 
the process, threatens to "detach" law from justice (pp. 27-28). But, 
satisfactory or not, the constitutional theorist's first obligation is to 
understand what law is. The moves, on both the left and the right, to 
shore up constitutional decisionmaking by tying it to inquiries external 
to the practice itself are driven by 
the[] belief that legal statements depend upon some factual state of af-
fairs that is their foundation. There is a lesson in contemporary philoso-
phy for the legal critic, but it is a cold one. Twentieth century 
philosophy discredits many of the epistemological assumptions of natu-
ral law and positivism, of formalism and realism, but it does not replace 
these schools .... The message of such philosophy is: you are on your 
own; we've done enough harm already. [p. 175] 
For Bobbitt, then, a constitutional decision is legitimate if it re-
mains within the grammar of constitutional argument - the modali-
ties he describes. These patterns of discourse determine whether a 
legal statement is true and, over time, they secure the legitimacy of the 
system as a whole. Their compromise or rejection threatens the legiti-
macy of constitutional law commensurately. Mark Tushnet claimed 
that "[c]ritique is al1";25 Bobbitt counters that practice is all. 
Bobbitt approaches the problem of modal conflict in a similarly 
straightforward manner. How is a constitutional dispute to be re-
solved if, as might be typical, historical and prudential arguments sug-
gest that a challenged government action is permissible, but doctrinal 
and textual arguments indicate that the act is beyond the authority of 
the state? Again, Bobbitt embraces the seeming weakness of his posi-
tion and declares it a strength: the "practices [of argument], taken as 
a group, also enable justice, not because they are determinate but ... 
precisely because they are not determinate" (p. 31). 
Bobbitt resolves the problem of modal conflict by recourse to the 
conscience of the individual jurist: the "United States Constitution 
formalizes a role for the conscience of the individual sensibility . . . 
when the modalities of argument clash" (p. 168). The "space for 
moral reflection on our ideologies is created by the conflict among mo-
dalities," (p. 177) and the "recursion to conscience is the crucial activ-
22. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
23. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989). 
24. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 55 (1962). 
25. TusHNET, supra note 10, at 318. 
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ity on which the constitutional system of interpretation ... depends" 
(p. 184). Furthermore, the "incommensurate modalities give us vari-
ous possible worlds against which to measure our sense of justice and 
fitness" (p. 157). 
The search for an overarching principle to resolve such conflicts, 
on the other hand, is not only doomed to failure, but it "ought to fail" 
(p. 157). The provision of a dispositive "meta-rule would disable 
moral choice .... [making] the art of decision into a kind of placid 
pornography" (p. 162). For Bobbitt, our system of constitutional re-
view reflects an "incomplete, institutional morality that requires a de-
cision, requires a choice" (p. 169). This is both inevitable and 
beneficial, since "making decisions actualizes and in some cases even 
precipitates our values" (p. 166). 
II. CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED 
There is, perhaps not surprisingly, a good deal to question about 
Professor Bobbitt's dual response - emphasizing law as practice and 
using the private judicial conscience to smooth modal conflicts. The 
notion of law as a set of practical moves may avoid interpretive weak-
nesses and the circularity of achieving legitimacy by external referent, 
but it fails to escape some of constitutional jurisprudence's perennial 
difficulties. 
Consider the sweep of the modalities that Bobbitt identifies. Ethi-
cal argument, for example, is derived from the "American cultural 
ethos . . . reflected in the Constitution" (p. 20). Its primary focus is 
the "reservation of powers not delegated to a limited government" (p. 
21). Examples of its use appear in cases like Griswold, 26 Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 27 Meyer v. Nebraska, 28 and Roe. 2 9 In addition, 
Lochner v. New York 30 and a bevy of other controversial cases31 could 
be added to the list. A moment's review of these decisions reveals that 
the line between acceptable state social policies and the reserved pri-
vacy of the citizenry is one of the most repeatedly and heatedly de-
bated issues in American political history. These cases also reveal a 
remarkable list of contentions that could plausibly masquerade under 
the capacious notion of ethical argument. 
This pattern of argument is likely insignificant compared to the 
26. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
27. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
28. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
30. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
31. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Allied Structural Steel 
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
I assume also that Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), and PruneYard Shop-
ping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), could have been decided the other way. 
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"prudential" category. Bobbitt describes the prudential mode of argu-
ment as "seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule" 
(p. 13). Prudential assertions legitimately introduce "the practical ef-
fects of constitutional doctrine into the rationales" (p. 16). Prudential 
claims are "actuated by the political and economic circumstances sur-
rounding the decision."32 
Doctrinal argument, yet another of Bobbitt's modes, focuses on 
"the distinctive characteristics of common law courts."33 Its greatest 
description was offered by Henry Hart: 
[T]he Court is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling tradi-
tion of Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position in 
the structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged 
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and 
developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law .... 34 
My point here is not the obvious one that such forms of argument 
are significantly indeterminate. Rather, Bobbitt's notion of the modal-
ities as practice must be built upon an assumption that not every type 
of policy assertion is legal argument. After all, not everything qualifies 
as doing economics or doing math. But, given the potential breadth of 
at least these three patterns of argument, 35 all forms of policy disputa-
tion could apparently be reformulated into one of Bobbitt's modes. I 
have never had a great deal of confidence that constitutional argument 
could be segregated - Langdellian style - from the broader strands 
of social and public discourse. 36 But surely one would have a better 
shot at doing that by adopting a rigid and grudging vision of the ac-
ceptable sources oflegal doctrine, such as Lino Graglia's. 37 A concep-
tion as grand and encompassing as Bobbitt's makes the task hopeless. 
Regardless of his wishes, the breadth of Bobbitt's categories of ar-
gumentation also resurrects the dreaded countermajoritarian diffi-
culty. One can overcome philosophical problems of legitimacy by 
concentrating on law's performative characteristics, but surely the de-
mands of democracy remain. Bobbitt argues, for example, that "[b]y 
relying upon a written instrument to perfect the constitutional under-
standing, the framers of the United States Constitution introduced the 
modalities of legal argument into the politics of the state" (p. 5). But 
32. BoBBIIT, supra note 19, at 61. 
33. Id. at 41-42. 
34. Id. at 44 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term - Foreword: The 
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959)). 
35. Charles Black has shown that structural argument can be quite expansive. See CHARLES 
L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981). 
36. See Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. Cow. L. REV. 419, 420 (1992) (arguing that 
Langdell's efforts "enabled legal academics to stabilize and close off that which we call 'law' and 
to insulate this domain from the other humanities"). 
37. See Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Mysticism: The Aspirational Defense of Judicial Re· 
view, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1344 (1985) (book review). 
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the modalities that Bobbitt describes are not the modalities that pre-
vailed in 1789. Constitutional decisions obviously stay the hand of 
majority sentiment. Did the Framers implicitly endorse any form of 
legal argument that the profession might subsequently develop? 
Surely not. If they did, they overplayed the tum to legalism in this 
constitutional democracy. Despite Bobbitt's efforts to free us from 
legitimacy concerns, Alexander Bickel's conviction that the limits of 
judicial authority "can be sensed but not defined and are communi-
cated more as cautions than as rules"38 hits closer to the mark. 
On more than one level, Bobbitt's recursion to conscience to re-
solve modal conflicts is also troubling. When the patterns of argument 
lead in inconsistent directions, under this view, a constitutional deci-
sionmaker should consult her conscience to achieve the appropriate 
result. 
My purpose is not to deride Bobbitt's tum to conscience. As I will 
explain below, removing choice from our understandings of constitu-
tional decisionmaking is neither possible nor desirable. Nevertheless, 
one need not be a professional nihilist to conclude that the patterns of 
constitutional argument conflict in almost every significant case. 
Thus, individual conscience assumes a huge role in Bobbitt's scheme. 
For many Americans, the notion that the consciences of certain Jus-
tices will measure the powers of government would cause significant 
and perhaps understandable apprehension. 
Bobbitt's heavy dependence on private conscience also suffers from 
a disappointing inconsistency. Constitutional Interpretation master-
fully explores the processes of constitutional argument. It illuminates 
classic opinions of constitutional law as it unravels them. It teaches 
about the public processes of constitutional inquiry by examining the 
nature of argument and assessing the validity, with measured skepti-
cism, of proffered claims. In this sense, it seeks to make constitutional 
analysis more accessible, accountable, and comprehensible for all citi-
zens. If, however, at the crucial moment, constitutional decisionmak-
ing turns inward to the private conscience of the judge, Bobbitt's 
hopeful project seems, ultimately, futile. Conscience is a conversation 
stopper, like, ironically, the critical scholar's claim that all is politics. 
Its role in the constitutional decisionmaking process is unexplored 
and, perhaps, unexplorable. Yet Bobbitt has described the play of 
conscience in idealized terms: "The space for moral reflection on our 
ideologies is created by the conflict among modalities, just as garden 
walls can create a space for a garden" (p. 177). The strong tum to 
conscience leaves us mystified as to what occurs inside the garden. 
38. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 26 (1975). 
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After such compelling descriptions of the walls, that's more than a 
little disappointing. 39 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
Despite these shortcomings, Constitutional Interpretation provides 
strong bases for optimism. Decisions in American constitutional law 
do oscillate between plausible, often even equally plausible, rationales. 
Almost all constitutional scholars accept this indeterminacy as a fact 
of modem decisionmaking. Some claim, as a result, that the founda-
tions of constitutional law are illegitimate examples of judicial poli-
cymaking; some attempt to provide yet another new theoretical 
Rosetta stone that will render constitutional law comprehensible, con-
sistent, and predictable; others tum their attention away from the ap-
plication of legal norms altogether. Philip Bobbitt, on the other hand, 
welcomes the choice that has always been present in constitutional de-
termination. 4-0 Decisions according to law, in his view, "inevitably re-
quire conscience - that is, they require a decision, not a calculation or 
an interpretation, or even a passionate conviction" (p. 183). Ours is an 
incomplete institutional morality, a morality that requires choice in 
implementation, and we are better off for it. 
In this sense, Bobbitt's journey mirrors that of Justice Holmes in 
"The Path of the Law."41 For Holmes, the danger in constitutional 
interpretation was the assumption that results "can be worked out like 
mathematics from some general axioms of conduct."42 Behind the 
"logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance 
of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and uncon-
scious judgment, [but one that lies at] the very root and nerve of the 
whole proceeding."43 "[J]udges themselves," Holmes wrote, "have 
failed adequately to recognize their [inevitable] duty of weighing con-
siderations of social advantage."44 Rather than leave the foundation 
of judgments inarticulate, Holmes demanded that we "get the dragon 
out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, ... count his teeth 
and claws, and see just what is his strength."45 
The power of Bobbitt's work lies in his embrace of choice, of judg-
ment. Far too much legal scholarship overreacts to the existence of 
discretion - panting that one choice is as good as another, that, con-
39. See Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 STAN. L. REV. 270, 301-07 
(1993) (reviewing PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991)). 
40. I have explored the role of choice in our history of constitutional decisionmaking else· 
where. See Nichol, Constitutional Law, supra note 7. 
41. o.w. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
42. Id. at 465. 
43. Id. at 466. 
44. Id. at 467. 
45. Id. at 469. 
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trary to Hamilton, judgment is impermissible in the judiciary,46 or 
that, absurdly, everything can be defended and convincing arguments 
can always be found to support an opposing claim. Those charged 
with exercising responsibility, of course, have ample respect for the 
demands and the rigors of choice. Judges stake their very professional 
lives on the belief that wise choices further the aims of our social and 
political communities. To evade choice, or even to think that the qual-
ity of their choices does not have a decided impact upon the lives of 
their fellows, is not open to them. 
Bobbitt understands this well. As a result, he emphasizes the role 
of judgment - both its dangers and its possibilities. One of those pos-
sibilities is that the exercise of judgment will help to "actualize" our 
values (p. 166). Constitutional norms do not necessarily precede our 
choices, full blown and free standing. Until made concrete, they may 
be only vague attractions or attitudes. Brown v. Board of Education 47 
did not simply dust off an earlier political rule; it created a societal 
commitment, launching a value that was before, in every meaningful 
sense, unreal. 
Bobbitt's exploration of constitutional argument - even if it can-
not capture the entire process of decisionmaking - moves the 
"dragon" a step or two "out of the cave." His multifaceted examina-
tions of constitutional problems, including Iran-Contra and the Bork 
hearings,48 clarify the stakes and reveal the assessments made. He 
claims that "the study of the modalities of constitutional argument 
makes the analysis of legal reason-giving more perspicuous," (p. 30) 
and his own example proves him right. It is heartening to be reminded 
how ground-gripping, and simultaneously enlightening, constitutional 
inquiry can be. 
Unlike almost any other sophisticated modern constitutional 
scholar, Bobbitt turns from the sky to the practices ofjudging.49 Judg-
ing is, fundamentally, what matters most in our constitutionalism,50 
and the work of judges, obviously, is not driven by metatheory, but by 
46. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton defended judicial review by claiming that judges would 
exercise judgment, not will. THE FEDERALISf No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
48. Bobbitt offers a nonconventional description of Judge Bork's trials. Pp. 83-108. He fre-
quently praises Judge Bork and concludes that the "[j]udiciary Committee appears to have re-
jected Robert Bork's nomination on the basis of an erroneous assessment of his judicial 
philosophy." P. 105. In Bobbitt's view, Judge Bork "was a highly principled, courageous nomi-
nee even if some of his principles were not precisely as they were taken to be." P. 106. Bobbitt 
assumes, therefore, that Bork fundamentally misunderstood many of his own positions - no 
high compliment. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Bork's Dilemma, 16 VA. L. REV. 337 (1990). 
49. Bobbitt accomplishes this in two primary ways. The first, of course, is through the study 
of constitutional argument. The second, and less obvious, is through the use of history and 
biography. The lessons of the past can tell us a good deal about good and bad judicial decision-
making. Again turning to Holmes, "[t]he rational study oflaw is still to a large extent the study 
of history." Holmes, supra note 41, at 469. 
50. I do not deny the strong role in constitutional decisionmaking that other governmental 
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competing demands of justice and constraint. As Judge Mikva has 
written, ''judges don't weave theories .... Judges decide cases."51 Ac-
ademic attention to the "art of deciding" (p. 170) can illuminate the 
practice of seeking justice. 
* * * 
I began this review with an exaggerated portrait of the dilemmas of 
recent constitutional scholarship. I end with an illustration of the de-
mands of judgment. In the November election the voters of Colorado 
passed, by initiative, a constitutional amendment entitled, harmlessly 
enough, the "Taxpayers Bill of Rights."52 The provision removes the 
power to tax from the legislature and imposes spending and bonding 
limitations upon state and local governments. The amendment is an 
1800-word masterpiece that very few voters read and literally no one 
understood. Buried within its almost indecipherable paragraphs are a 
number of other proscriptions on government power. The new 
amendment is now beginning to wreak its intended havoc upon public 
services in Colorado. 
Apparently a challenge to the validity of amendment one under the 
state constitution is possible. The Colorado Constitution, like that of 
California and some other western states, distinguishes between 
"amendments" and "revisions" of the charter. The initiative process 
is available to adopt "legislation and amendments to the constitu-
tion. "53 Constitutional conventions, on the other hand, may be em-
ployed to seek "revisions, alterations [and] amendments."54 The 
California courts - no doubt experts on the initiative process - rec-
ognize substantive distinctions between amendments and revisions. 
In 1990, for example, the California Supreme Court invalidated 
one provision of an enacted ballot initiative requiring that a laundry 
list of state procedural guarantees "not be construed . . . to afford 
greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Con-
stitution of the United States."55 The proposition was said to "unduly 
restrict[ ] judicial power" and to "severely limit[ ] the independent 
force and effect of the California Constitution."56 Such "comprehen-
and private actors frequently play. But even in nonjudicial fora, the patterns of argument and 
decisionmaking mimic those developed in the judicial system. 
51. Abner J. Mikva, The Role of Theorists in Constitutional Cases, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 451, 
452 (1992). 
52. COLO. CoNsr. art. X, § 20 (adopted at Nov. 3, 1992 general election). A second amend· 
rnent passed by the Colorado voters in 1992 has received more attention. Amendment two pro· 
hibits public entities in Colorado from enforcing policies against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. COLO. CoNsr. art. II, § 30b. This provision has sparked a boycott against the state 
and has been challenged in the Colorado courts. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, A Ban on Gay-Rights 
Laws Is Put on Hold in Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, § 1, at 6. 
53. CoLO. CoNsr. art. V, § 1. 
54. COLO. CONsr. art. XIX, § 1. 
55. Raven v. Deukrnejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1086 (Cal. 1990). 
56. 801 P.2d at 1088. 
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sive changes" in governmental structure, the court agreed, are "revi-
sion[ s ]" rather than mere "amendment[s]," thus necessitating "more 
formality, discussion and deliberation than is available through the ini-
tiative process."57 
Under Colorado's amendment one, tax increases can be accom-
plished only by statewide vote. The legislature can no longer impose 
new taxes. The taxing and spending powers are effectively dislodged. 
Surely then, under the California line of cases, there is a reasonable 
doctrinal constitutional argument that we Coloradoans have "revised" 
our republican form of government - a step beyond the scope of the 
initiative process. That the convoluted amendment is laden with es-
sentially undiscovered alterations of state and local authority lends 
credence to the California courts' line of reasoning that revisions to 
the constitution require a deliberative process not triggered through 
initiative. 
But, not surprisingly, the doctrinal strands in the California deci-
sions run in conflicting directions. For example, in upholding proposi-
tion 13, which required a supermajority for, but did not prohibit, 
legislative tax increases, the California Supreme Court noted that the 
"power of initiative must be liberally construed . . . to promote the 
democratic process."58 
If amendment one were to be challenged in the Colorado courts, 
then a familiar dilemma would arise. Doctrinal and textual arguments 
would suggest that the amendment could be invalidated. The drawing 
of a line between amendments and revisions may well be essential, 
given the occasional efforts to rewrite an entire state constitution 
through a simple and possibly uninformed majority vote in the initia-
tive process. 59 Prudential arguments would support that result as 
well, if I am right that the new provision will visit significant and un-
anticipated harms on the state's public sector. But the case for invali-
dation would be far from compelling. The Colorado courts are not 
"bound" to accept California precedents, and, as I indicated, those 
decisions are hardly overpowering. More importantly, amendment 
one was embraced by a majority of the Colorado electorate. The vote 
reflected a marked unhappiness with "business as usual" in state gov-
ernment. For one set of government officials, judges, to protect the 
rest from perceived accountability to the electorate would lead to 
strong and renewed public opposition. Furthermore, the people of my 
57. 801 P.2d at 1085-86 (noting that the quoted parts of petitioners' argument were "well 
taken" with regard to one provision of the initiative in question). 
58. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 
1283 (Cal. 1978) (quoting San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council, 529 P.2d 570, 572 
(1974)), overruled by Los Angeles County Transp. Commn. v. Richmond, 643 P.2d 941 (1982). 
59. See, e.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948) (invalidating California initia-
tive adding a new article to the constitution and altering 15 of 25 of the cqnstitution's articles), 
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). 
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state are surely entitled to presume that their electoral decisions will 
be given full recognition in the courts. Absent some federal mandate, 
a state tribunal treads on thin ice when it rejects the clearly expressed 
will of the people. 
How then should a constitutional challenge to amendment one be 
measured? Text, doctrine, history, and structure may well set the 
outer bounds of permissible decisionmaking. But, as is often the case, 
those helpful inquiries will not provide final solace. They will indicate, 
finally, that a judicial choice must be made - a choice among sup-
portable alternatives; a choice that is, inevitably, "legal": a choice that 
is, in nature, "constitutional." That does not mean that the decision 
reached will ultimately be illegitimate. Quite the contrary. An answer 
to the proffered structural question must be provided, and I have little 
doubt that some answers would be far more conducive to the effective 
operation of Colorado government and to the premises of our democ-
racy than others. 
It is not too much to hope that such an exercise of judgment can be 
explored, articulated, and evaluated. For judgment is not merely a 
declaration of individual conscience - a statement of internal, per-
sonal, and subjective preference. It looks outward to the world around 
us. It is the life of the judge, and a basis for optimism in our constitu-
tional regime. 
